MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP.
vs. SSANGYONG CORP.
G.R. No. 170633; October
17, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner MCC
Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila,
is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel
products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an
international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and
regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations
conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the
details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its
representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to
Ssangyong, again by fax.
Following the failure of
MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported stainless
steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September
11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2,
and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing
expenses, interests and charges.
Ssangyong then filed, on
November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against
defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their
contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for
the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and
ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested
its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the
civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the
demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been
admitted in the December 16, 2002 Orde and their admissibility finds support in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000. According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and
documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the
complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether the print-out
and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible in evidence as such?
HELD:
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an
electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic
document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible
in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing
must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic
document."
In an ordinary facsimile
transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it
noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended
virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the
same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as
all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and
are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of
"electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable
with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a
paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each
other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments
in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded
the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except
computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
"electronic data message."We, therefore, conclude that the terms
"electronic data message" and "electronic document," as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under
the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile
transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an
"electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic
evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax
transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and
"F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals,
are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.
NAPOCOR
vs. CODILLA
FACTS:
Bangpai Shipping’s
vessel allegedly bumped and damaged NAPOCOR’s Power Barge. NAPOCOR filed a
complaint for damages against Bangpai. NAPOCOR adduced evidence during trial.
These pieces of evidence were just PHOTOCOPIES (of letters manually signed,
forms, cost of damages, etc.) NAPOCOR never presented the originals.
The trial judge denied
admission of these documents. The trial judge held that said pieces of
documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents or papers.
NAPOCOR attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending
that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the
document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence NAPOCOR filed
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 invoking GADALEJ Vs CA dismissed
petition for certiorari. NAPOCOR insists that the photocopies it presented as
documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own
premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section
1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information
that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather,
petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to
other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as
photocopies, as included in the section’s catch-all proviso: "any
print-out or output, readable by sight or other means".
ISSUE:
WON the photocopies are
within the purview of an “electronic document” under the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.
HELD:
An "electronic
document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.5 It includes digitally signed documents and any printout,
readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.
What differentiates an
electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the
information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic
document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
A perusal of the
information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically.
By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be
considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner
that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process,
then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous,
interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies
are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same
may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed
in the law.
ZALDY
NUEZ vs.ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO
A.M. No. CA-05-18-P; April
12, 2005
FACTS:
The complaint arose out
of respondent’s solicitation of P1,000,000.00 from Zaldy Nuez in exchange
for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter’s pending case in the CA,
which was initially lodged with the Action Center of the Television program
Imbestigador of GMA Network. The case referred had been pending with the
CA for more than two years. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, he
sought the assistance of Elvira sometime in July 2004 after learning of the
latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their
first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they
exchanged via SMS, he informed her of the particulars of his pending
case. Allegedly, he thought that she would be able to advise him on
how to achieve an early resolution of his case. However, a week after
their first telephone conversation, Elvira allegedly told him that a
favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the
person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for
P1,000,000.00.Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money
since he had been jobless for along time then tried to ask for a reduction of
the amount but Elvira held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by
her but by the person who was going to make the decision. He then
asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange
for the decision.
In August of 2004, he
sought the assistance of Imbestigador . The crew of the TV program accompanied
him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion.
Thereafter, he communicated with Elvira again to verify if the latter was still
asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that her offer
of a favorable decision in exchange for P1,000,000.00 was still standing, the
plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in
cooperation with the PAOCC.
ISSUE:
Should the text messages
of Elvira be admitted as evidence against her?
HELD:
In this case, Zaldy and
the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because Elvira demanded the
amount of P1,000,000.00 from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision
of the latter’s pending case. Zaldy’s narration of the incidents which led to
the entrapment operation are more in accord with the circumstances that
actually transpired and are more credible than Elvira’s version. He was able to
prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages fromElvira duly
presented before the Committee that the latter asked for P1,000,000.00 in
exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the
CA.
The text messages were
properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section
1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone
conversations, text messages . . .and other electronic forms of communication
the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."Under Section 2, Rule
11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case,
Zaldy who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Elvira herself
admitted that the cellphone number reflected in Zaldy’s cellphone from which
the messages originated was hers.
Moreover, any doubt
Elvira may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid
to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the
text messages between her and Zaldy. It is also well to remember that in
administrative cases,technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied.
The Court has no doubt
as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the
guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case. Zaldy’s testimony as to the
discussion between him and Elvira on the latter’s demand for P1,000,000.00 was
corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the
reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in person.
Siringan was privy to the parties’actual conversation since she accompanied complainant
on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
GARCILLANO
vs. HOUSE
G.R.
170338; December 23, 2008
FACTS:
Virgilio Garcillano
filed a petition alleging that he is the person alluded in the "Hello
Garci" tapes. He was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. Thus, Garcillano claimed
that he was directly injured by the House Committee's actions and charged them
of electoral fraud. He prayed to the Court for the petition of prohibition. He
filed for the restrain of the House Representative Committees from using the
"illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee
reports and for any other purpose. Garcillano requested that the said
recordings should be stricken off the records of inquiry, and the respondent
House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of
the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Is non-publication of
the Rules of Procedure governing legislative investigations fatal?
HELD:
Yes, it "may"
be fatal. According to Sect. 21, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution,
"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." Hence, the respondent
Committee could not, in violation of the constitution, use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry until the procedures are so published.
But the Court notes that
the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There
is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
"Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by these events,
the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After
all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about
to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS
VS. SALUD
A.M. No.
CA-05-20-P; September 9, 2005
FACTS:
Melchor Lagua was found
guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. On appeal, the case was assigned to the
Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423.
Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition
well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003,
directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.
Irma Del Rosario,
Utility Worker, noticed the respondent’s unusual interest in the Lagua case.
The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court
had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and
was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of
the case were eventually found. Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the
Order of Release Upon Bond,and to notify the mailing section that there were
orders requiring personal service. At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then
went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and stapling the
papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to
the Mailing Section.
On November 7, 2003, the
respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order
of release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison compound at around
2:30 p.m. In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain
Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. It was about 2:00
p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s
provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought
the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a
balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the
respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms.
Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative.
On November 11, 2003,
Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the
respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any
other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of
release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Justice Magtolis
then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L.
Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent to another office
which has nothing to do with cases.
Justice Magtolis lodged
the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003,
containing, among others, the following allegations:
The delivery of resolutions/orders
to unauthorized persons and “complete strangers” who promised to “take care
thereof” (“siya na raw ang bahala”) constitutes not only neglect of duty but
also conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Staying for the
whole day within the vicinity of the National Bilibid Prisons to the point of
failing to fulfill his other duties for the day constitutes inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties. On the other hand, the use
of my name and that of our Division Clerk of Court to illegally solicit
financial or material benefit from parties with pending cases before this Court
is illegal per se.
In view of the
foregoing, it is respectfully requested that Cielito Salud be subjected to an
administrative investigation and disciplinary action.
In his
counter-affidavit, the respondent vehemently denied the charges. He never
demanded money from Lagua’s relative; his name had been used by someone and
was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the fact that he
immediately released the CA order in question was clear proof that he had no
financial interest in the transaction.
As pointed out by the
Investigating Officer, the respondent’s claim of “joking around”
(“nakipaglokohan”) with an unknown sender of a text message by replying thereto
is contrary to a normal person’s reaction. This is made even more apparent by
the fact that the respondent even admitted that he called Atty. Madarang twice,
and when asked why, gave a vague answer, and, when further questioned, even
broke down in tears.
ISSUE:
Whether or not admission
of text messages is a violation of right to privacy.
HELD:
No. The text
messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered
by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations,
text messages … and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11
of the [said rules], “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal
knowledge thereof … .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their
contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was
hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of
the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It
is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or
lack thereof of respondent in this case.
The respondent’s
actuations fall short of the standard required of a public servant. He is
guilty of gross or grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from
duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior,
while “gross,” has been defined as “out of all measure; beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.”Under the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is punishable by
dismissal from the service even for the first offense, as it is classified as a
grave offense. However, considering that the respondent has not been previously
charged nor administratively sanctioned, the Court finds that a penalty of
suspension for one year and six months will serve the purpose of disciplining
the respondent.
Court personnel, from
the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that of
a judge or justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and parties
seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon them as part of the
Judiciary. They serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on
their part immeasurably affect the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people’s confidence in it. Thus, any conduct which tends to diminish the image
of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA
A.C. Mo. 7204; March 7, 2007
FACTS:
Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarmnent case against Atty. Ernesto
M. Macabata on the ground of gross immorality. She alleged that sometime in
December 2004 she sought the legal advice of the Atty. Macabata, regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. On February 10, 2005, met at
Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of
filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not
settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, Atty. Macabanta sent
Cynthia home and while she is about to step out of the car, held her arm and
kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
On March 6, 2005, Cynthia met Atty. Macabanta at Starbucks coffee
shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be
filed in Court. After the meeting, Atty. Macabanta offered again a ride, which
he usually did every time they met. Along the way, Cynthia was wandering why
she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At
along Roosevelt Avenue , Quezon City, when she was almost restless Atty.
Macabanta stopped his car and forcefully held her face and kissed her lips
while the other hand was holding her breast. Cynthia succeeded in resisting his
criminal attempt and immediately managed to get out of the car.
In the late afternoon, Cynthia sent a text message to Atty.
Macabanta informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer
and needs to get back the case folder from him.
ISSUE:
WON the exchange of text messages between Atty. Macabanta and
Cynthia are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
In Bar Matter No. 1154, good moral character was defined as
what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by
the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality. It should be noted
that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the
lips. However, it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the
moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as
a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community,
and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or
beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms
of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning
the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable,
cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took
advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual
relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the
complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as
to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Thus, the adage
that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove." As a basic rule
in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei
incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit.
In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with
the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing
does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on
the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion
because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by
the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately
extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts
are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or
suspension.
TERESITA
G. NARVASA vs. BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ, JR..
G.R. No. 169449; March
26, 2010
FACTS:
The parties to this case
are employees of the Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya (the LGU). Petitioner
Teresita G. Narvasa is a senior bookkeeper while respondent Benjamin A.
Sanchez, Jr. is the municipal assessor.
Sanchez was charged with
three counts of sexual harassment cases, filed separately, by petitioner along
with Mary Gay P. de la Cruz and Zenaida M. Gayaton, who are also employees of
the LGU.
Based on the
investigation conducted by the LGU’s Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(CODI), Sanchez was found guilty of all three charges by Municipal Mayor Marvic
S. Padilla. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission, modified Mayor Padilla’s
order by holding him guilty of rave misconduct instead of sexual harassment.
Petitioner now comes before this Court to appeal the downgrading of
respondent’s offense to simple misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts
committed by respondent against petitioner constitute simple misconduct or
grave misconduct.
HELD:
Misconduct means
intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Respondent’s acts of
grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional.
Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler
overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances were not
welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were
much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his
actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and
respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified
his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions.
Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent
not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married
state, and good character and reputation.
We disagree with the CA
that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of an established rule attended the incident in question. RA 7877, the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Respondent
was charged with knowledge of the existence of this law and its contents, more
so because he was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner and
attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of
his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in
the work environment. Assuming arguendo that respondent never
intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner was a flagrant
disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial – that
intimate physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s
defiance of custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex were more appalling
because he was a married man. Respondent’s act showed a low regard for women
and disrespect for petitioner’s honor and dignity.
The CA, however,
interpreted respondent’s repeated apologies to petitioner as an indication of
the absence of intention on his part to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed. On the contrary, such persistent attempts to make peace with
petitioner indicated how well respondent was aware of the gravity of the
transgression he had committed. Respondent certainly knew of the heavy penalty
that awaited him if petitioner complained of his aggressive behavior, as she,
in fact, did.
EVA
LUCIA Z. GEROY vs. HON. DAN R. CALDERON,
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2092;
December 8, 2008
Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2685-RTJ
Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2685-RTJ
FACTS:
Complainant submitted
before the Court a letter-complaint dated June 13, 2007 charging Judge Dan R.
Calderon with gross immorality for having an extra-marital affair with her. She
alleged that after they were introduced in November 2002 respondent
always communicated with her, visited her at her house and showered her with
food and gifts, making her believe that he was single or separated as he acted
like a bachelor towards her. They spent most of their time in his house in
Upper Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City where complainant would sleep over during
weekdays and spend entire weekends with respondent. They would dine in public
places, watch movies, go to malls, groceries and hear mass together. Respondent
lent her money and she ran errands for him such as making reservations for his
trips and purchasing items for his house, encode decisions, pay bills and
encash checks for him. Respondent paid her tuition in a caregiver course and
gave her a cell phone for an e-load business. In her letter- complaint,
she attached transcripts of respondent's text messages to her from December
2002 to 2005, pictures of her taken inside respondent's house, pictures of
complainant's diary, cellphones, gifts allegedly given to her by respondent,
receipts showing the name of respondent, and a photocopy of a check showing
that respondent lent her money.
ISSUE:
Should Judge Calderon be
held guilty of gross immorality?
HELD:
The complainant, in
administrative proceedings, has the burden of proving by substantial evidence
the allegations in her complaint; the Court finds that the complainant in
this case was able to discharge such burden. As correctly found by the
Investigating Justice, the complainant was able to support her charge of
immorality against respondent and has shown that the latter had not exhibited
the ideals and principles expected of a magistrate. The disclosure by
complainant of very intimate facts about respondent and respondent's own
seemingly innocuous admissions clearly reveal the existence of an illicit
affair. Complainant would not have known personal information about respondent,
such as the skin tags in between his thighs, if they really did not have an
intimate physical relationship.
Respondent's own
admissions are also inconsistent with his claim that his relationship with
complainant is purely platonic and professional. As gathered from the
transcripts:
Q Mr. Witness, do you
recall that December 1, 2002 you have been calling up and then is it not that
November 30 we've met, we were introduced, the following day you texted me and
said in Annex A-1 it is there December 1, 2002 at 8:32:33 in the morning you
were texting, "Gud am, just saying thanks for the wonderful
evening"?
A Yes, but I am not sure if
that is accurate text message but I was being polite, it is in my nature.
x x x x
Q Do you remember then, Mr.
Witness that after your family went back to Manila January 6 you were texting
me again saying that was already 6 January 2003 you were texting, "knock,
knock hello are you still there"?
A This could be right
because this was in reply to your earlier text message which I've read.
x x x x
Q In fact, Mr. Witness, you
texted me in my Annex "I-c" it was there on December 8, 2002 at
1:24:9 early morning, do you remember because on December 7 I was with you, we
were together we were in your house nobody was there and no son Ian Phillip was
there, we savor our togetherness at that time, do you remember this text
message, Mr. Witness which I quote, "I feel more 4 your comfort Tet,
I felt u really nid d rest, I just can't resist it wen u're here u know."
A I don't remember if this
is the exact message that I sent you; but this would indicate that I gave you a
lot of work, these were the first things that you were working for me but it is
not that because you were in my house; that is a lie.
x x x x
Q Is it not also, Mr.
Witness, you were always appreciating our togetherness and wonderful evening
like what you said in your text message on 21 January 2003 2:43:44 in the
morning you texted to me I quote,"Am in my room now thanks for a wonderful
evening the songs and the towelets sleep tight", it was already 2:43:44 in
the morning, do you remember that?
A I remember this
particularly and I checked a mistake, this was a Friday and we had our rotary
meeting here in the rotary bar site, when I went home I read your text because
I believe before I went to the rotary meeting I passed by your house and we
talked and you gave me something, I think it was a CD or a recording that you
gave me, I do not remember about the towelets but you gave me some CDs and then I
went home from the rotary I read your text that was the only time I read your
text and I answered,but I do not think it was this late also it could have been
that you received my text message late or you intentionally erroneously typed
this wrong time, this late time.
While respondent insists
that his relationship with complainant is purely professional, the text
messages which admittedly came from him are not of the kind an employer would
ordinarily send an employee. Try as he might, respondent's own admissions betray
his claim of innocence.
LOURDES S. ESCALONA vs. CONSOLACION S. PADILLO
A.M. No. P-10-2785;September 21, 2010
FACTS:
Complainant filed a complaint charging respondent with Grave
Misconduct. Escalona claimed that she approached Jun Limcaco the president of
their homeowners’ association, regarding her problem with Loresette Dalit.
Limcaco referred her to Padillo to help facilitate the filing of a case against
Dalit. Padillo allegedly promised to prepare the necessary documents and asked
for P20,000 purportedly as payment for the prosecutor. Escalona
requested that the amount be reduced to P15,000. Padillo received
the P15,000 at the Little Quiapo Branch Better Living Subdivision.
Thereafter, Escalona received a text message from Padillo informing her that
the prosecutor was not amenable to the reduced amount of P15,000.
After two weeks, Escalona gave the balance of P5,000 to Padillo
allegedly for the service of the warrant of arrest. Escalona was also asked to
submit a barangay clearance and to first take an oath before Prosecutor Antonio
Arquiza, Jr. and later before Prosecutor Napoleon Ramolete. However, subsequent
verification from the Prosecutor’s Office showed no record of a case filed
against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the
money. Padillo reneged on her promise. Hence, this complaint.
Meanwhile, Escalona withdrew her complaint against Padillo in a
Sworn Affidavit of Desistance alleging that Padillo already returned to her the P20,000.
This notwithstanding, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock sent two
notices to Padillo requiring her to submit her comment to the complaint of Escalona.
ISSUE:
Should Padillo be held guilty of grave misconduct?
HELD:
The Court Administrator found Padillo guilty of grave misconduct
for soliciting money from Escalona in exchange for facilitating the filing of a
case against Dalit. Padillo’s act of soliciting money from Escalona is an
offense which merited the grave penalty of dismissal from the service. However,
considering that Padillo tendered her resignation on 18 February 2007, a month
after the complaint was filed but did not and has not filed any claim relative
to the benefits due her, the Court Administrator recommended that all benefits
due her, except accrued leave credits, be forfeited and that she be
disqualified from reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
We agree with the Court Administrator that this Court could no
longer impose the penalty of dismissal from the service because Padillo
resigned a month after the filing of the administrative complaint. However, her
resignation did not render the complaint against her moot. Resignation is not
and should not be a convenient way or strategy to evade administrative
liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction. There is
no doubt that Padillo received from Escalona P20,000 purportedly
"for fiscal & judge" and "for warrant officer" and this
amount was "intended to facilitate" the case against Dalit. This is
shown in the receipt signed by Padillo herself.
ELLERY
MARCH G. TORRES vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION,
represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR.
G.R.
No. 193531;December 14, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner
was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of PAGCOR. On the basis of an
alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of
the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF
Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of
respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent
PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an
investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the
scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first digit
of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of
the actual CMR. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts
and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February
and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were
responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
On
May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges for
dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and
regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is
dismissal and was found guilty.
Petitioner
appealed before the Civil Service Commission but the same was denied, as well
as the motion for reconsideration she filed. Hence, she filed with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the twin resolutions issued by the CSC.
The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It found
that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that he had
filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner contends that he filed his
letter reconsideration of his dismissal on August 13, 2007, which was
within the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a
facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors.
He claims that the sending of documents thru electronic data message, which
includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter
reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his complaint
before the CSC.
ISSUE:
Is
petitioner’s contention that his letter asking for a reconsideration of
his dismissal filed on time?
HELD:
No.
Pursuant to Sections 37, 38, 39, and 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a motion for reconsideration may
either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration
was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the
postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On
the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the
date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from
receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal therefrom.
Petitioner
received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the
motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by
personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show
that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC
found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly
supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration
which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter
reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner
in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for
reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal
delivery.
In
Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of
pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
A
facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal
over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver
to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the
correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that
produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
x x
x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact
copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no
way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in
fact, be a sham pleading. x x x
Moreover,
a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the
Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong
Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile
transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic
documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:
We,
therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and
"electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.
